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THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY




REV. PETER M. J. STRAVINSKAS*
INTRODUCTION
The recent debate over tuition tax credits has highlighted the need
for in-depth reflection on the issue of parental freedom of choice in edu-
cation, especially with respect to its constitutional implications. Both
supporters and opponents of state aid to parochial schools agree that the
Supreme Court has done violence to the first amendment. According to
state-aid proponents, this has resulted from denying certain types of ben-
efits to parochial schoolchildren. In contrast, the critics contend that the
first amendment has been violated by permitting any type of state sub-
sidy to parochial schools. The general tenor of those who have com-
mented on the public education-religion conundrum is well summarized
in the following editorial comment:
Two thousand years from now a team of archaeologists from an outer-
space colony may excavate a kitchen midden on the site of the U.S. Su-
preme Court building amid the ruins of what had once been the city of
Washington, D.C. If they came upon a collection of opinions in cases de-
cided under the first section of the First Amendment, will these diggers be
able to reconstruct that clause if its text is nowhere given in the bale of
documents? Not in a millenium. From details of litigation dealing, for in-
* The Rev. Peter M. J. Stravinskas, Ph.D., is East Coast Director of the Catholic League for
Religious and Civil Rights, based in Trenton, New Jersey. This contribution is based on a
chapter from his doctoral dissertation, presented to the School of Education of Fordham
University, and is part of a forthcoming book to be published by Book Crafters, Inc.
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stance, with bus rides for children in nonpublic schools or with the refusal
of Jehovah's Witnesses to salute a classroom flag, those busy scholars of the
future are not likely to distill these 16 words: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."'
Because state aid to parochial schools is so emotionally charged, it is
not an easy topic of study. Indeed, it is difficult to find dispassionate dis-
cussions on the matter even among scholars. Nevertheless, the approach
taken by this Article is to examine the issue from four vantage points
through reference to the relevant literature. The first segment traces the
language and intent of the first amendment. The second phase of the
analysis centers on the derivative doctrine of separation of church and
state. The third matter of interest is the range of opinion on how the
Court should handle conflicts between the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment. The final line of investigation concerns
how this nation has lived with the first amendment, especially with re-
spect to Supreme Court treatment of educational freedom of choice for
nonpublic school parents.
THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The very essence of the debate over governmental assistance to non-
public school parents revolves around the meaning assigned to the ex-
pression "establishment of religion." In many of the Supreme Court deci-
sions, "establishment of religion" has been equated with "religious
establishment."2 Many legal scholars have taken serious exception to this
interpretation of the establishment clause. For example, Kenealy declared
that "an establishment of religion means the official erection of one relig-
ion into a preferred position by law."3 In a similar vein, Coleman main-
tained that the establishment clause of the first amendment "reflects the
feeling formed in this country that one of the important things was to
avoid a situation in which one religion became a government-sponsored
religion."4
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,5 a case that dealt
with religious instruction in public schools, the Supreme Court rejected
' Current Comment, Clerical Discounts, 134 AMERICA 191, 193-94 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899); Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 43, 48 (1815). But see P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 52 (1964) (not-
ing the scarcity of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the establishment clause).
3 Kenealy, The Private School and Public Law, in 2 INST. OF CHURCH AND STATE PROC. 65
(1959).
' Coleman, The Private Trust and Public Law, in 2 INST. OF CHURCH AND STATE PROC. 40-41
(1959).
5 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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these explanations of establishment.' O'Neill has observed, however, that
the Court based its position exclusively on the notion that the first
amendment means what Jefferson, Madison and the other founding fa-
thers intended it to mean, and that this literalist interpretation "is given
all the respect to which it is entitled when it is labeled semantic and his-
torical nonsense."7 An examination of the Congressional Record gives
credence to O'Neill's position,8 and also reveals Madison's personal un-
derstanding of the first amendment: "[tihat Congress should not establish
a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men
to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience. '
Emerson, basing his opinion on these commentaries and the method
of ascertaining intent prescribed by McCollum, remarked that "[tihe
meaning and significance of the First Amendment to the people of the
new nation is to be found in the existing law of England and the colo-
nies."' Similarly, Howe has suggested that "the principal responsibility
of judges is to carry out the 'intention' of those who framed the constitu-
tion."" Moreover, according to Sobran, the "[f]ramers were opening the
way to multiple religious influences on the state, rather than prohibiting
them all. The point was to prevent one church from having an automatic
advantage over the others. This should increase, not diminish, the influ-
I Id. at 210. The Court observed that the first amendment proscribed government attempts
to " 'set up a church' " and enactments " 'which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another.'" Id. (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1948)).
It then dismissed the school board's argument that the establishment clause only prohibited
"government preference of one religion over another," contending that "both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere." 333 U.S. at 211-12.
J. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1949).
8 See 124 CONG. REC. 25,662 (1978) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). A number of versions of
the first amendment were proposed and debated in the first Congress:
[Committee:] No religion shall be established by law ....
[House:] Congress shall make no law establishing religion ....
[Senate:] Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of
worship.
[Madison:] . . . nor shall any national religion be established ....
See R. Burrs, THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 79-90 (1950). For the
official account of the congressional debate on the establishment clause, see 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 451, 757-60, 783-84, 796 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
9 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 758 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
1*1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 20 (4th ed. 1976).
" Howe, The Constitutional Question, in RELIGION AND THE FREE SOCIETY 49 (1958).
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ence of faith in our public life."' 2
There is, however, disagreement over the validity of determining the
original intent of the framers. Black has noted that "the textual method,
in some cases, forces us to blur the focus and talk evasively . . .
Kauper has argued that there are "difficulties in using Madison and Jef-
ferson as authoritative interpreters of the . .. First Amendment." '14 In
addition, Pfeffer asserts that "this sanctification for all ages of a specific
desire of the original framers smacks of ancestor worship.' 15
The Supreme Court itself has not been helpful in this regard, vacil-
lating between these two methods of interpretation. In Quick Bear v.
Leupp,'6 a case that dealt with the use of Indian funds for parochial
schools, the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment by itself was
insufficient to outlaw such use of funds. 7
Similarly, Smith observed that, in Everson v. Board of Education,8
the Court "found it impossible to answer the specific question put to it on
the basis of the text of the first amendment alone, but made its judgment
with the aid of the concept of separation of Church and State."' 9 Further-
more, Freund observed that the first amendment analysis of Justice Rut-
ledge, who dissented in Everson, "ha[s] been questioned by scholars,
theologians, polemicists and judges."2 Emphasizing that charge, Corwin
2 Sobran, The Abortion Culture, 7 HUMAN LIFE REV. 7, 19 (Spring 1981).
"3 C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (1969).
" P. KAUPER, supra note 2, at 49-50.
" Pfeffer, The Case for Separation, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 53 (J. Cogley ed. 1958).
lB 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
'7 Id. at 81-82. The Court determined that the money being used to support the sectarian
schools was not from the public fisc, but rather belonged to the Indians and was merely
being administered by the federal government. Id. at 80-81. Since the money belonged to
the Indians, the Court reasoned, they had a right to use the money to provide the type of
education they wanted for their children, even if that education was religious. Id. at 81-82.
To deny the Indians the right to choose religious education for their children was viewed by
the Court as tantamount to denying them the right to practice their religion freely. Id. at 82.
Is 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, a New Jersey statute authorized reimbursement for the
costs of transporting children to sectarian schools via the public transportation system. Id.
at 3-4. Tracing the history of the first amendment, the Court noted that the persecution of
religious nonconformists by European and the early colonial governments was the main rea-
son for the religious freedom provisions in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 8-13. The Court then
observed that these provisions were sufficiently broad to prohibit even the slightest govern-
mental intrusions into the affairs of religious institutions. Id. at 15-16. Moreover, the Court
rejected the creation of a rule that would prevent a state from extending "general state law
benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief." Id. at 16. Since the pur-
pose of the New Jersey program was to insure the safe transportation of schoolchildren, it
was held constitutional even though it benefited parochial school students. See id. at 18.
1 E.A. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 252 (1972).
"0 2 P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND
OTHER PROBLEMS 2098 (1967).
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noted that "undoubtedly, the Court has the right to make history, as it
has often done in the past, but it has no right to make it up."
21
An additional question concerns the applicability of the establish-
ment clause to the states. A careful reading of the amendment, in con-
junction with a knowledge of colonial history, reveals that Congress is to
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. The matter is thus
not expressly addressed with respect to the states.2 2 Accordingly, many
states continued their established churches long after ratification of the
first amendment.2" Katz has remarked that this reduces considerably "the
force of the textual argument for the broad 'no aid' interpretation."2"
Although the first amendment, in its entirety, has been made appli-
cable to the several states by judicial incorporation,2 5 it has been recog-
nized that this process is not a wholesale incorporation. Katz has asserted
that "[t]he prevailing view is that the Bill of Rights is imposed on the
states only to the extent of the essentials of a system of ordered lib-
erty. '26 Likewise, Corwin observed that "[iut is only liberty that the Four-
teenth Amendment protects. 27
Since the free exercise clause, unlike the establishment clause, pro-
tects an individual's liberty interest, arguably it is the free exercise clause
that applies to the states.2 s Although this question is academic, 2 '9 the indi-
vidual states could legitimately establish churches, but remain precluded
from infringing upon a citizen's right to the free exercise of religion.
A final consideration is whether the establishment clause categori-
cally precludes governmental assistance to parochial schools. Katz has ob-
served that "it is by no means clear that the 'no establishment' clause
"' E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 116 (1951).
22 S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 510 (1968); see 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
757-58 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (debate over whether to forbid establishment of a national relig-
ion); Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 95-97 (J. Cogley ed.
1958) (reasonable to interpret the establishment clause as relating only to congressional
powers). But see 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra, at 784 (Madison's opinion that states must be
kept from infringing upon fundamental rights).
2 See R. BUrrs, supra note 8, at 39-40; S. COBB, supra note 22, at 510-17.
" Katz, supra note 22, at 102.
28 E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1946); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Can-
trell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
"0 W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 30 (1964).
27 E. CORWIN, supra note 21, at 114.
"a See W. KATZ, supra note 26, at 29-30.
29 See P. KAUPER, supra note 2, at 55-57. Professor Kauper's position appears to be that,
due to the Supreme Court decisions applying the establishment clause to the states, discus-
sion of whether or not this should be done is academic. Id. at 57; see Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1963).
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forbids inclusion of religious schools in general aid programs." 30 Others
sound a more forceful statement: "[Tihe state . . . can comply with the
First Amendment if it makes available funds for strictly secular purposes
in all schools."'" Further, Kauper has interpreted the situation as follows:
"[T]he Court says that the legislature may take account of the religious
interests of its people in its legislative program so long as it does not act
with coercive effect upon dissenters and nonbelievers and no preference is
given to any one religious group."3
The Supreme Court, in Abington School District v. Schempp,33 ap-
peared to have accepted the line of reasoning suggested above.34 In Com-
mittee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,3" however,
the Court took a more restrictive stance.36 Justice White dissented, re-
minding his brethren that "the test is one of 'primary' effect, not any
effect."3 7 Pfeffer attacked any such attempt at a carefully nuanced inter-
pretation of the first amendment by stating, "I have no doubt that most
of the instances cited in support of a narrow interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause are inconsistent with its spirit and intent.""
30 W. KATZ, supra note 26, at 66.
3' Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in THE WALL BE-
TWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55, 62 (D. Oaks ed. 1963). Blum certainly would concur with the
notion that funds for all schools, as long as for a secular purpose, would be legitimate:
"[Tihe decisive question is not, who is entrusted with the expenditure of public funds, but
for what purpose are public funds expended. If the purpose is a public purpose, it matters
not that the agency which spends the money is private or church-related." V. BLUM, FREE-
DOM IN EDUCATION 100 (1965).
3* P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 18 (1962).
33 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
"4 See id. at 225. In Schempp, a Unitarian family challenged the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania law requiring Bible reading in public schools at the beginning of each school-
day. Id. at 205. After reviewing a number of its prior holdings, the Court focused upon the
first amendment requirement of government neutrality in regard to religion, id. at 222, and
enunciated a two-part test to determine whether a statute is properly neutral: "[T]o with-
stand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. Since the Pennsylvania
law mandated the performance of "religious ceremony," the law failed to meet both require-
ments, and the law was held unconstitutional. Id. at 223.
35 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
" See id. at 788-89. Nyquist dealt with a constitutional challenge to a New York statute
that provided for maintenance and repair grants to nonpublic schools, and tuition reim-
bursements and tax benefits to parents of nonpublic school students. Id. at 761-67. The
Court struck down these provisions because their effect was to subsidize sectarian schools.
Id. at 779-80, 788-89, 794.
" Id. at 823 (White, J., dissenting).
's Pfeffer, supra note 15, at 79. The thrust of Pfeffer's argument is that it is impractical to
look to the specific intent of the framers in order to interpret the religious clauses of the
first amendment. Id. at 52-53. It is sufficient, he contends, to interpret these clauses in con-
formity with the framers' general interest; that is, to prevent the government from estab-
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As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the establishment
clause has evoked considerable scholarly and judicial commentary. This
has stemmed not only from the varying theories of constitutional inter-
pretation but also from the sensitive nature of the church-state question.
The following section examines the church-state relationship in somewhat
more detail, still utilizing the contributions of constitutional scholars.
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The "wall of separation between Church and State" had its origin in
a letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association. In
that letter, Jefferson denied the Association's petition for a national day
of prayer and fasting." Since the case of Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion," the wall metaphor has played a major role in many cases relating
to church-state relations. The position of "absolute separatists" is well
known"1 and needs no further documentation or elucidation. There is,
however, a group of scholars who analyze the "separation" doctrine differ-
ently and whose views have not as yet been sufficiently heard.42 For ex-
lishing a church or interfering with the affairs of religious institutions. Id. at 74-77, 92. The
Friedmans, however, regard the failure to give state aid to families of parochial schoolchil-
dren as a penalty and as violative of "the spirit of the first amendment, whatever lawyers
and judges may decide about the letter." M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN FREE TO CHOOSE 154
(1981).
11 See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT
(1964). Thomas Jefferson is regarded as one of the strongest opponents of government aid.
See D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 199, 270 (1981). For
this reason, Senator Packwood, during the tuition tax credit debate of the 95th Congress,
presented what he considered to be evidence of Jefferson's support of his proposed
legislation:
Let the record show that when Thomas Jefferson was President, he submitted to
the Senate in 1803 a treaty concluded with the Kaskaskia Indians, and a part of that
treaty read as follows:
And whereas the greater part of said tribe have been baptized and received into
the Catholic Church to which they are attached, the United States will give annually,
for seven years one hundred dollars toward the support of a priest of that.religion,
who will engage to perform for said tribe the duties of his office, and also to instruct
as many of their Children as possible, in the rudiments of literature, and the United
States will further give the sum of three hundred dollars, to assist the said tribe in
the erection of a church.
Mr. President, those are not the writings and that is not the treaty of a man who
says that you cannot use public funds for private sectarian education.
124 CONG. REC. 25,812 (1978).
40 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
" Among the ranks of the "absolute separatists" are Paul Blanshard, Leo Pfeffer, and John
Swomley. See P. BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 103-04 (1959); L.
PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 343-58 (1975); J. SWOMLEY, RELIGION THE
STATE AND THE SCHOOLS 17-26 (1968).
" See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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ample, O'Neill raised questions concerning Jefferson's true intentions:
[W]e know conclusively, if we know Jefferson, that he could not possi-
bly have been thinking of a wall so high, so impregnable, so absolute, so
completely without gates, or stiles, or friendly openings, as forever to pro-
hibit any intercourse, neighborly help, or cooperation of any kind between
government and religion.'3
O'Neill's conclusion finds support in a 1948 editorial in the American Bar
Association Journal."
As an alternative, Hutchins has argued emphatically against even the
mere use of the wall metaphor: "The wall has done what walls usually do:
it has obscured the view. . . . The wall is offered as a reason. It is not a
reason; it is a figure of speech." '4 5 He declared further that "[tihat wall
has no future because it cannot help us to learn. '46 Similarly, Abraham
counselled against reliance on this image because "the doctrine of the
'wall' is no solution per se. It fails because the necessary line depends
overridingly on public policy considerations . . . and on the interests of
contending groups . . . .",v Clancy has argued against the concept from
yet another point of reference:
[Tihe "wall of separation" metaphor is an unfortunate and inexact
description of the American Church-State situation. What we have constitu-
tionally is not a "wall" but a logical distinction between two orders of
competence.
The "wall" of separation between Church and State, as it is conceived
by most "absolute separationists" in America, is not really a constitutional
concept. It is rather a private doctrine.'8
Kurland wrote that the principle of separation "is meant to provide a
starting point for solutions to problems brought before the Court, not a
J1 . O'NEILL, supra note 7, at 83.
44 Editorial, No Law But Our Own Prepossessions, 34 A.B.A. J. 482, 482 (1948). This edito-
rial reviewed the case of Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 203 (1947),
criticizing the holding for being an extreme interpretation of the first amendment. Editorial,
supra, at 483. In support of its conclusion that the first amendment did not forbid all state
acts of assistance to religion, the editorial set forth a number of historical examples of mutu-
ally beneficial interaction between church and state. Id. at 484-85. For example, "[als Presi-
dent of the United States, Jefferson used public funds and government properties in aid of
religion and religious education in various ways... .- Id. at 484. This was precisely Sena-
tor Packwood's conclusion. See supra note 39.
, Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE WLL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 19 (D.
Oaks ed. 1963).
40 Id. at 25.
41 H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 296 (3d ed. 1977).
48 Clancy, Religion as a Source of Tension, in RELIGION AND THE FRE SOCIETY 27-28 (1958).
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mechanical answer to them,"49 and Kauper advocated an understanding
of this principle as deriving from the first amendment and, consequently,
dependent upon that amendment for its meaning."
Katz also discussed the separation concept. Recalling its purpose,
Katz stated that "[s]eparation ordinarily promotes religious freedom; it is
defensible so long as it does so, and only so long."'" Additionally, he de-
lineated an important implication of a policy of absolute separation, ad-
monishing that such a rule "would mean outlawing provisions designed to
implement religious freedom, as in the armed forces."5 2 Littell asserted
that "religious liberty and a 'wall of separation' are not identical."53
Moreover, Blanshard, an inveterate opponent of parochial school aid,
conceded: "Our country did not formally establish separation of church
and state in educational matters until the nineteenth century ...
[U]ntil about 1825 the religious domination of elementary schools was
taken for granted by the majority of Americans. Most schools before 1825
were Protestant. '54 The inconsistencies in the application of the separa-
tion doctrine prompted Brickman to observe: "When a principle, such as
that of Church-State separation, has been consistently violated with com-
mon consent over the years, it is reasonable to inquire if it has not been
downgraded to an 'unprinciple' or 'anti-principle.'-
Although the expression "separation of Church and State" has as-
sumed an air of unchangeable doctrine and immutable truth, Marnell has
49 P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962).
P. KAUPER, supra note 2, at 18. Apparently viewing the separation doctrine as of limited
importance, Kauper stated:
The Zorach opinion recognizes that the First Amendment itself says nothing about
the separation of Church and State. Separation is not in itself a starting point in
constitutional thinking. It follows and is required only to the extent that it flows from
the clauses related to nonestablishment and the free exercise of religion.
Id.; see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952). The Zorach case involved a tax-
payer's challenge of a "released time" program authorized by a New York statute. Id. at 308
& n.1, 309. Under the program, children whose parents signed a release card were permitted
to leave school grounds during school hours to attend religious instruction; children without
such permission remained in the classroom. Id. at 308. Upholding the constitutionality of
the program, the Court observed that, while church and state must be separated under the
dictates of the first amendment, separation need not be absolute. Id. at 312-13. The "re-
leased time" program involved in McCollum was distinguished on factual grounds. Id. at
315. That program required the religious teachers to use public school property, whereas in
Zorach the public schools merely "accommodate[d] their schedules to a program of outside
religious instruction." Id. The Court believed such accommodation was not only constitu-
tional, but was in keeping with "the best of our traditions." Id. at 314.
" Katz, supra note 22, at 97.
" W. KATZ, supra note 26, at 13.
" F. LITTELL, FROM STATE CHURCH TO PLURALISM 100 (1962).
" P. BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 84 (1960).
56 W. BRICKMAN, SUBSIDIZED PLURALISM IN AMERICA 115 (1959).
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challenged the Supreme Court's reliance upon this approach:
It is one of the curious anomalies of the recent history of the Supreme
Court that a Court whose membership has shown a vigorous readiness to
apply new viewpoints to certain ancient problems of society should view the
American relationship of Church and State as if it had been from the begin-
ning and was as the law of the Medes and the Persians, which altereth not."
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSES IN CONFLICT
If the constitutional provisions forbidding governmental establish-
ment of religion and guaranteeing the free exercise of religion conflict,
which takes precedence? Both scholarly and judicial opinion on the mat-
ter is varied. Byrnes' reading of history led him to maintain that "when
the two clauses conflict, the Free Exercise Clause has generally been held
to rule." 7 In Kauper's analysis, the reason for this occurrence is that the
Supreme Court has "elevated religious liberty to the position of a pre-
ferred freedom . . ... " Tribe has asserted: "[T]he free exercise principle
should be dominant in any conflict with the anti-establishment principle.
Such dominance is the natural result of tolerating religion as broadly as
possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of
establishment. 59 Furthermore, many constitutional experts believe there
is a direct link between religious liberty in the context of the educational
scene and government subsidy. For example, Fritz-Nova declared:
We might very well reason that there is an unreasonable interference
with education if there is no assistance given for non-public or sectarian
schools. Very plausibly you might say there is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment where certain types of parents and guardians are prevented
from sending their children to private schools for various reasons.60
John Stuart Mill, discussing a tax on stimulants, remarked that
"every increase of cost is a prohibition to those whose means do not come
up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on
them for gratifying a particular taste."" A clear analogy can be drawn
between the situation described by Mill and the predicament of parents
desirous of a parochial school education for their children.
A philosophical justification for state aid can be found in Maritain's
position: "[I]f education is not outside [the state's] sphere, [state aid] is
66 W. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 114 (1964).
17 L. BYRNES, RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 64 (1975).
58 P. KAUPER, supra note 2, at 43.
89 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 833 (1978).
60 Fritz-Nova, The Private School and Public Law, in 2 INST. OF CHURCH AND STATE PROC.
94 (1959).
" J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 178 (1898).
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to help the family fulfill its mission, and to complement this mission
. ,,. Similar logic led Tribe to state that the requirements of the free
exercise clause of the first amendment "demand that government pursue
the least drastic means to a compelling secular end . . "S Katz argued
that the government's position vis-a-vis religion should be neutral, and
perceived this neutrality as requiring state aid to parochial schools. 64
Powell suggested that the Supreme Court's difficulty with the area of pa-
rochial school aid centered on the free exercise clause: "[The Supreme
Court] conceives free exercise of religion in such narrow terms, i.e., within
thewalls of the church or the home, it is not really cognizant of violations
of the rights of others for whom religion and education are much more
intimately joined."65
While suggesting that state aid may be unconstitutional since it
would force the general populace to aid religion, Pie raised the following
objection: "[T]o insist that a man must spend his money to support an
irreligious system of education, such as is contained in the public system,
is equally unfair.""0 The same logic was operative in Parson's intriguing
observation: "No Catholic parent has yet sued to show that his religious
liberty is violated by using his taxes exclusively for only one kind of
school, a school to which his church and religious conscience forbids him
to send his children. '17 Such thinking, however, is by no means universal.
For instance, Archer remarked that "[a] devoutly religious parent . . .
should be willing to sacrifice to insure [parochial] education for his or her
children."" Is the right of religious liberty then restricted to the affluent?
Archer responded, "I don't think so. . . .Where there's a will, there's a
way." 69 Gordon, on the other hand, has dismissed the entire argument
since he perceives tuition costs as a mere side effect of the prior choice of
private education.7 0 In a brilliant analysis, Sobran links the establishment
e2 J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 79 (1943).
" L. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 847.
" Katz, supra note 22, at 109. In a later work, Professor Katz reiterated the principle that
neutrality required state aid to parochial schools:
While the government should not promote religion, it not only may, but should, try to
avoid restraining or burdening religious choices. And if groups wish to have parish
schools, there seems to me a presumption in favor of so molding government fiscal
policies as not to handicap that choice.
W. KATZ, supra note 26, at 77.
" Powell, Public Schools and the First Amendment, 139 AMERICA 8 (1978).
" Pie, The Private School and Public Law, in 2 INST. OF CHURCH AND STATE PROC. 112
(1959).
" W. PARSONS, THE FIRST FREEDOM 121 (1948).
e Menendez, An Interview with Glen L. Archer, 29 CHURCH & STATE 15 (1976).
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"0 Gordon, The Unconstitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in THE WALL BE-
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of religion question with the establishment of a unitary school system.71
It has become commonplace to assert that the rights of the majority
are as safe as the rights of any given minority. Swomley attacked Roman
Catholics for being more concerned with themselves than with the general
public. In apparent rejection of the above axiom, he stated that "the
weight of Roman Catholic thinking on elementary and secondary educa-
tion seems more concerned with 'justice' or 'freedom of choice' for Roman
Catholics than with religious liberty for the entire community. 7 2 Tribe,
however, did not accept such thinking. He admonished that we ask
"whether, in the present age, religious tolerance must cease to be simply a
negative principle and must become a positive commitment that encour-
ages the flourishing of conscience. "'7
Two CENTURIES OF LIVING UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The current ban on state aid to nonpublic school parents is not as
deeply rooted in our historical framework as some would surmise.
Kraushaur put it rather bluntly when he stated, "[p]ublic support for va-
rious types of denominational schools, as well as religious instruction in
the public common schools where they existed, were the rule rather than
the exception. '7 4 Lachman further delineated the nature of the public
schools of New York when he decribed them as "Protestant sectarian
schools maintained by private associations. '75 Kienel referred to these
schools as "an extension of the Protestant Church. So much so that the
Catholic Church established its own Catholic schools in protest to the
'Protestant' public schools."' "s Religious control of schools has been so
much a fact of life that in 1889 Montana, the Dakotas, Wyoming and
Washington had to adopt ordinances forbidding such control, in order to
71 Sobran, supra note 12, at 12. In a novel, as well as logical approach to the issue, Sobran
stated:
Let us spell out the analogy of this culture to an established church. When the
state has an official religion, it may, as in England, tolerate others. But the estab-
lished church is paid for out of public monies taken compulsorily, as all taxes are,
from all citizens. You have to pay for it whether you belong or not. If you want an-
other church in keeping with your own beliefs, you pay for it out of the money the
state has left you.
That is how our educational system now works: you pay for the schools from
which religion is banned whether your children attend them or not, whether you
agree with them or not, whether you think them good influences or not.
Id.
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qualify for statehood.7 7 It is important to note that the fourteenth
amendment, which presently forbids the individual states from providing
substantial financial support to denominational schoolss7 8 was passed in
1868. The early history of the first amendment thus reveals that (1) de-
nominational schools received government support; and (2) public schools
were effectively Protestant schools. Completely different conclusions,
however, are drawn from an examination of this century's treatment of
the religion clauses of the first amendment.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters7 9 the Court followed the trajectory of
earlier approaches to pluralism in education.8 0 According to Drinan, the
Court "recognized the right of the private school to exist as a substitute
for the public school, thereby giving private schools a judicial status."81
Drinan further observed: "Everson follows from Pierce. Public money, in
other words, cannot logically be withheld from the private school if it is
publicly accredited as an institution where children may fulfill their legal
77 See A. SToKas & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 435 (1964).
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7, See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-09 (1971). In Lemon, the Court examined the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania program that reimbursed nonpublic schools for costs of
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and other educational materials. Id. at 606-07. A Rhode Island
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schools was also in question. Id. The Court held both statutes unconstitutional on the
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duty to attend school.""2
Continuing historically where Drinan left off, Pfeffer admitted:
"When the Everson decision is coupled with the Allen decision they lead
logically to the conclusion that States may, notwithstanding the First
Amendment, finance practically every aspect of parochial education."' 3
The Allen decision,"4 however, was followed in quick succession by nearly
a dozen other cases, most of which had disastrous consequences for non-
public school parents.85
Adamo offered one reason for the Court's decided change in attitude,
perhaps simplistically but not fully unfounded: "Pfeffer has been bril-
liantly successful in persuading the Supreme Court that anything which
is good for the Catholic Church must be bad for the nation as a whole."8
Rhodes reported that Mark DeWolfe Howe, a non-Catholic, rendered a
similar evaluation of the situation: "One day, in the middle of taking up
the then-current crop of church-state cases .... [Howe] said that what
you think of all these questions depends on what you think of the Catho-
lic Church."8
The confusion surrounding the constitutionality of this issue is noth-
ing less than astounding, so much so that Senator Packwood, during the
tax credit debate, proclaimed: "There is a complete split in the authori-
ties. There is a split in the courts. For every constitutional expert the
' Id. at 60; see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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• . . instrumental in the teaching of religion," the effect of the act is likewise secular. See id.
at 247-48. The purpose and effects test of constitutionality was therefore met. See id. at 243,
248.
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opponents of this bill can cite saying it is unconstitutional, we can cite
one saying it is constitutional.""
Some members of the Senate used the doubtful state of the question
to argue that Congress had no right to enact legislation of questionable
constitutionality. Both Packwood and Ribicoff denied the validity of that
position,8 9 while Moynihan argued:
[Hiowever the Court does rule, the important consideration is that its ruling
will be accepted. Nobody associated with this legislation intends anything
but the absolute acceptance of whatever the court hands down. But given
that acceptance, and pending any decision, we must not be expected to
yield up our own analytic abilities, our own sense of historic reality, our own
disposition to state what we feel the outcome ought to be."
Tortora picked up on this line of reasoning but did not exhibit a very
hopeful attitude or outlook:
Similarly, the gathering support for tuition tax credits may, in due
course, founder on the shoals of a Court decision that they violate the "sep-
aration of church and state." That such a ruling would be a preposterous
misreading of the First Amendment's reference to "establishment of relig-
ion" doesn't give us any less reason to predict it. It would just represent (to
paraphrase Raoul Berger's indictment in Government by Judiciary) "an-
other of the usurpations that bestrew the path of the Court."'
CONCLUSION
This Article presented historical and constitutional analysis through
reference to relevant judicial and scholarly commentary. This commen-
tary has importance in underscoring two significant aspects of the consti-
tutional decision-making process. On the one hand, the Court, when ad-
dressing the constitutionality of tuition tax credit legislation or similar
programs, must confront the conflict between the facts of history and the
Court's past opinions on the question of governmental assistance to non-
public school parents. On the other hand, commentary of the legal com-
munity retains a rightful and deserved place within our constitutional
process. The approach of this Article therefore seems cogent, for the
Court must heed and confront past and present insights, lest the Justices
decide magnanimous cases in a vacuum.
" 124 CONG. REc. 26,046 (1978).
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